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The operation of confirmatory bias in the endorsement of personality descriptions was examined 
in 4 studies. Unlike M. F. Davies (1997), who provided only inferential evidence for the role of this 
bias, the present studies provided direct evidence through the experimental manipulation of 
supporting versus contradictory cognitions. Generating supporting thoughts resulted in greater 
acceptance whereas generating contradictory thoughts resulted in lower acceptance of personality 
descriptions. Supporting cognitions were found to be generated before contradictory cognitions in 
line with a positive test strategy but evidence was also found for an output interference effect 
(generating one type of thought interfered with the generation of the opposite type) and it was 
suggested that confirmatory bias is due to the operation of both mechanisms. 
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Confirmatory bias is the tendency to seek out information that is consistent with a belief or 
hypothesis and to ignore or overlook information that is potentially inconsistent (see Evans, 
1989; Plous, 1993). Klayman and Ha (1987) proposed that an important aspect of confirmatory 
bias is the use of a positive test strategy. Such a strategy involves testing a hypothesis by looking 
for examples where the hypothesized property is known or expected to be present rather than 
absent. For example, in testing the hypothesis that a person is an extravert, a questioner will ask 
questions such as “Do you like parties?” that, if answered affirmatively, would confirm the 
hypothesis rather than questions such as “Do you like to be on your own?” that, if answered 
affirmatively, would disconfirm the hypothesis (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978). 
 
In the case of judgments about the self, we possess complex and detailed knowledge of our past 
history that is diverse and often contradictory (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Savin-Williams 
& Demo, 1983). For many aspects of the self, therefore, people should be able to find evidence 
that confirms a given hypothesis through the use of a positive test strategy. In a series of 
studies, Davies (1997) found that people use a positive test strategy when evaluating the accuracy 
of personality feedback. They generated more confirmatory than disconfirmatory cognitions in 
response to the feedback and their accuracy ratings reflected this relative availability of 
confirming versus disconfirming evidence. However, this research provided only indirect 
evidence (through correlational and covariance analyses) for the role of confirmatory bias because 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory processing were not experimentally manipulated. 
 
In the present series of studies, I set out to experimentally manipulate confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory processing in the evaluation of self-relevant information. Previous research 
has shown that people automatically retrieve confirmatory evidence when making judgments. For 
example, Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) had participants answer general knowledge 
questions, first choosing which of two alternatives was the correct answer and then estimating the 
probability that they were correct. Under normal conditions, participants showed typical 
overconfidence effects, but, when they were asked to generate reasons for and against the possible 
answers before choosing the correct answer, they showed significantly less overconfidence. Koriat 
et al. found that it was not the generation of reasons per se that improved judgments but rather 
the generation of reasons contradicting the chosen answer. When participants generated 
reasons supporting the chosen answer, Koriat et al. found no improvement in judgments. 
 
In the present series of studies, I investigated people’s evaluation of self-relevant information 
presented in the form of personality statements after they had generated either 
confirmatory and/or disconfirmatory cognition relating to the statements. Rather than use a 
personality feedback paradigm (as in Davies, 1997), I used a paradigm in which participants 
simply evaluated how accurately personality statements described them. 
 
Experiment 1: Confirmatory and Disconfirmatory Processing in the 
Endorsement of Generalized Personality Descriptions 
Method 
 
Participants. Eighty-five college students (31 men and 54 women) were recruited for the study as 
participants in a project on “understanding personality processes.” The mean age of the sample 
was 21.4 years (SD = 3.2; ages ranged from 18 to 32). 
 
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing instructions and 13 generalized 
personality descriptions corresponding to the original statements used by Forer (1949; e.g., “You 
have a great need for other people to like and admire you.”). The statements were described as 
having been devised for a new personality questionnaire, which the experimenter was interested 
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in testing on college students. The order of presentation of the statements was randomized across 
participants. 
 
Following the Cacioppo and Petty (1981) thought-listing procedure, participants in the thought-
listing conditions were asked to list their thoughts relating to each statement on a separate page in 
the booklet, each page being divided into 10 boxes such that each thought was written in 
a separate box. When evaluating each statement for its self-relevance, they were asked to think of 
examples from their past history including previous behaviors, thoughts, or feelings. Participants 
in the confirmatory condition (n = 22) were asked to write down examples from their past history 
in the thought-listing sections of the booklet labeled “Examples consistent with the personality 
statement.” Participants in the disconfirmatory condition (n = 21) were asked to write down 
examples from their past history in the thought-listing sections of the booklet labeled “Examples 
inconsistent with the personality statement.” Participants in the confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory condition (n = 21) were asked to write down examples from their past history in 
the thought-listing sections of the booklet labeled “Examples consistent and inconsistent with the 
personality statement.” They identified whether each example was consistent or inconsistent by 
writing a C or an I next to it. Participants worked at their own pace; there was no time limit on 
completing the thought-listing tasks. (Participants in the no-thought-listing condition [n = 21] 
were not asked to generate or list their thoughts.) After the thought-listing tasks, participants 
then judged how accurately each statement described them on a scale that ranged from 1 (not at 
all accurate) to 10 (extremely accurate). Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed about 
the study. 
Results 
 
The mean accuracy ratings are shown in Table 1. There was a significant main effect of thought-
listing condition, F(3, 81) = 10.96, p < .001. Planned comparisons showed that accuracy ratings 
were significantly higher in the confirmatory-only condition (M = 7.70) than in the no-thought 
condition (M = 7.06), t(81) = 2.06, p < .05, significantly lower in the disconfirmatory-
only condition (M = 5.96) than in the no-thought condition, t(81) = –3.51, p < .001, with no 
difference between the both condition (M = 7.15) and the no-thought condition (t < 1). 
Further planned comparisons showed that accuracy ratings were slightly higher in the 
confirmatory-only condition than in the both condition, t(81) = 1.75, p < .10, and lower in the 
disconfirmatory-only condition than in the both condition, t(81) = –3.81, p < .001. 
 
The numbers of consistent and inconsistent thoughts generated in the different thought-listing 
conditions are also shown in Table 1. Significantly more consistent thoughts (M = 2.69) 
than inconsistent thoughts (M = 1.64) were generated in the both condition, F(1, 20) = 16.57, p < 
.002, and more consistent thoughts were generated in the confirmatory-only condition (M = 3.76) 
than inconsistent thoughts in the disconfirmatory-only condition (M = 3.16), F(1, 41) = 4.58, p < 
.05. In addition, more consistent thoughts were generated in the confirmatory-only 
condition than in the both condition, F(1, 41) = 14.60, p < .001, and more inconsistent thoughts 
were generated in the disconfirmatory-only condition than in the both condition, F(1, 40) = 
28.62, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that generating only disconfirmatory thoughts led to 
significantly lower accuracy ratings for the personality descriptions than generating both types 
of thought or no thoughts, whereas generating only confirmatory thoughts led to significantly 
higher accuracy ratings than generating both types of thought or no thoughts. Generating both 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory thoughts did not produce accuracy ratings different from those 
in the no-thought condition. These results support the findings of Davies (1997), who found that 
the more confirmatory thoughts generated the higher the accuracy ratings of personality feedback 
and the more disconfirmatory thoughts generated the lower the accuracy ratings of 
personality feedback. The results however only partly support the findings of Koriat et al. (1980) 
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on the effects of generating supporting versus contradictory reasons on overconfidence in 
probability judgments. They found that generating supporting reasons did not 
produce differences in accuracy of probability judgments compared with no generation, whereas, 
in the present study, generating only confirmatory thoughts did lead to significantly higher 
accuracy ratings than the no-thought condition. There are a number of differences between the 
two studies that could account for this discrepancy. The most likely possibility is that in Koriat et 
al.’s second experiment, participants generated only one reason supporting and/or contradicting 
the chosen answer, whereas in the present study (as in Davies, 1997) participants could generate 
as many relevant thoughts as they liked. This may seem like a minor difference, but people’s 
judgments may well have been influenced by the amount of evidence supporting or contradicting 
a given personality statement. In fact, correlational analyses supported this reasoning. In the 
confirmatory condition, there was a significant positive correlation between number of thoughts 
listed and accuracy ratings (r = .52, p < .02). In the disconfirmatory condition, there was 
a significant negative correlation between number of thoughts listed and accuracy ratings (r = –
.47, p < .05). In the both condition, there was a significant positive correlation between number 
of consistent thoughts and accuracy ratings (r = .43, p < .05) and a significant negative 
correlation between number of inconsistent thoughts and accuracy ratings (r = –.46, p < .05). Of 
course, these correlational findings do not prove that differences in the number of thoughts 
generated led to differences in perceived accuracy. Not only is it possible that judgments of 
perceived accuracy could have led to differences in the number of thoughts generated, but 
there may well be a third unknown factor that accounts for the observed correlations. In addition, 
it is possible that participants’ accuracy ratings were based on ease of generation rather than 
number of reasons generated in line with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) analysis of the 
availability heuristic. The present study unfortunately cannot distinguish between these different 
possibilities. 
Experiment 2: Confirmatory and Disconfirmatory Processing in the 
Endorsement of True Versus False Personality Descriptions 
 
To increase the generalizability of the findings of Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 I examined the 
role of confirmatory and disconfirmatory processing in the evaluation of personality 
descriptions that were derived from actual psychometric test results rather than generalized 
personality statements. One problem with the use of Barnum statements is that their accuracy is 
unknown or uncertain. The use of well-validated psychometric instruments provides a better 
criterion against which to compare participants’ assessments of accuracy (although, of course 
such a criterion is a relative rather than an absolute or objective standard of accuracy). 
Method 
 
Participants. One hundred two college students (38 men and 64 women) were recruited for the 
study as participants in a project on “understanding personality processes.” The mean age of the 
sample was 21.6 years (SD = 3.4; ages ranged from 18 to 35). 
 
Procedure. In an initial mass testing session, participants were administered a number of 
personality inventories and psychometric tests, including the 16 Personality Factor (16PF) 
Questionnaire (Form A; Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970). For the experimental session 
approximately 4 weeks later, participants were informed that they would be given 
personality statements to evaluate. They were not told that the statements were based on their 
responses to an earlier personality questionnaire (the 16PF), and the results of the 
postexperimental debriefing did not reveal that any participants guessed that the statements were 
based on their earlier responses. The statements were described as having been devised for a 
new personality questionnaire, which the experimenter was interested in testing on college 
students. The order of presentation of the statements was randomized across participants. Half 
the participants were given 16 personality statements based on their genuine 16PF scores and the 
other half were given 16 statements based on false 16PF scores produced by reversing the polarity 
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of their real scores. The statements consisted of the brief 16PF descriptors with appropriate 
adverbial qualifiers (sten scores 1,10 = extremely; sten scores 2,9 = very; sten scores 3,8 = 
moderately; sten scores 4,7 = somewhat; sten scores 5,6 = slightly). 
 
The thought-listing and accuracy rating tasks were the same as those of Experiment 1. 
Participants in the confirmatory condition (n = 27) were asked to list thoughts that were 
consistent with the personality statements. Participants in the disconfirmatory condition (n = 25) 
were asked to list thoughts that were inconsistent with the personality statements. Participants in 
the confirmatory and disconfirmatory condition (n = 26) were asked to list thoughts that were 
consistent and inconsistent with the personality statements. Participants in the no-thought-listing 
condition (n = 24) were not asked to list their thoughts. After the thought-listing tasks, 
participants then judged how accurately each statement described them on a scale that ranged 
from 1 (not at all accurate) to 10 (extremely accurate). Finally, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed about the study. 
Results 
 
The mean accuracy ratings are shown in Table 2 as a function of thought-listing condition and 
true/false personality statements. 
 
As expected, there was a significant main effect of true versus false statements, F(1, 94) = 32.66, p 
< .001, such that descriptions based on true personality scores were judged significantly 
more accurate (M = 6.80) than those based on false personality scores (M = 5.40). There was also 
a significant main effect of thought-listing condition, F(3, 94) = 6.31, p < .001. Planned 
comparisons showed that accuracy ratings were significantly higher in the confirmatory-only 
condition (M = 6.82) than in the no-thought condition (M = 6.10), t(94) = 2.06, p < .05, 
significantly lower in the disconfirmatory-only condition (M = 5.33) than in the no-
thought condition, t(94) = –2.20, p < .05, with no difference between the both condition (M = 
6.16) and the no-thought condition (t < 1). Further planned comparisons showed that 
accuracy ratings were slightly higher in the confirmatory-only condition than in the both 
condition, t(94) = 1.94, p < .06, and lower in the disconfirmatory-only condition than in the both 
condition, t(94) = –2.40, p < .02. 
 
The numbers of consistent and inconsistent thoughts generated in the different thought-listing 
conditions for true and false personality statements are also shown in Table 2. As can be 
seen, significantly more consistent thoughts (M = 2.28) than inconsistent thoughts (M = 1.96) 
were generated in the both condition, F(1, 24) = 5.81, p < .05, and more consistent thoughts 
were generated in the confirmatory-only condition (M = 2.92) than inconsistent thoughts in the 
disconfirmatory-only condition (M = 2.63), F(1, 48) = 4.31, p < .05. In addition, more 
consistent thoughts were generated in the confirmatory-only condition than in the both condition, 
F(1, 49) = 20.98, p < .001, and more inconsistent thoughts were generated in the 
disconfirmatory-only condition than in the both condition, F(1, 47) = 27.67, p < .001. There was 
also a significant interaction of consistent/inconsistent thoughts and true versus false statements. 
As can be seen from the confirmatory and disconfirmatory conditions, more consistent thoughts 
(M = 3.38) than inconsistent thoughts (M = 2.16) were generated for true statements, whereas 
more inconsistent thoughts (M = 3.10) than consistent thoughts (M = 2.45) were generated for 
false statements, F(1, 48) = 45.19, p < .001. Also, in the both condition, more consistent (M = 
2.52) than inconsistent (M = 1.58) thoughts were generated for true statements whereas more 
inconsistent (M = 2.34) than consistent (M = 2.03) thoughts were generated for false statements, 
F(1, 24) = 22.76, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 
These results confirm the findings of Experiment 1. Generating only disconfirmatory thoughts led 
to significantly lower accuracy ratings for the personality statements than generating both types 
of thought or no thoughts, whereas generating only confirmatory thoughts led to significantly 
 Confirmatory Processing. Goldsmiths Research Online  
 
6
higher accuracy ratings than generating both types of thought or no thoughts. Generating both 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory thoughts did not produce accuracy ratings different from those 
in the no-thought condition. Although it is true that people tend to spontaneously think of more 
evidence supporting rather than contradicting a statement or outcome (as shown in the both 
condition), it is not the case that generating supporting evidence has no effect on their judgments. 
Unlike Koriat et al. (1980), the results of both experiments presented here show that the amount 
of supporting or consistent evidence generated does affect judgments. Again, in line with the 
results of Experiment 1, correlational analyses showed that in the confirmatory-only condition 
there was a significant positive correlation between number of thoughts listed and accuracy 
ratings (r = .48, p < .02), in the disconfirmatory-only condition there was a significant negative 
correlation between number of thoughts listed and accuracy ratings (r = –.51, p < .01), and in the 
both condition there was a significant positive correlation between number of consistent thoughts 
and accuracy ratings (r = .57, p < .01) and a significant negative correlation between number 
of inconsistent thoughts and accuracy ratings (r = –.48, p < .05). However, as in the Discussion of 
Experiment 1, it must be emphasized that these correlational findings do not prove that 
differences in the number of thoughts generated led to differences in perceived accuracy. It is 
possible that judgments of perceived accuracy could have led to differences in the number of 
thoughts generated or there may have been a third unknown factor that accounts for the observed 
correlations. 
 
One set of findings that has not been discussed so far is the fact that when required to list only one 
type of evidence (either consistent or inconsistent thoughts), participants generated 
more thoughts of a given type than when required to list both types of thought. In Experiment 1, 
those in the confirmatory-only condition generated 3.76 consistent thoughts whereas those in the 
both condition generated 2.69 consistent thoughts; those in the disconfirmatory-only condition 
generated 3.16 inconsistent thoughts whereas those in the both condition generated 1.64 
inconsistent thoughts. Similarly, in Experiment 2, those in the confirmatory-only condition 
generated 2.92 consistent thoughts whereas those in the both condition generated 2.28 
consistent thoughts; those in the disconfirmatory-only condition generated 2.63 inconsistent 
thoughts whereas those in the both condition generated 1.96 inconsistent thoughts. 
 
These findings could simply be due to some self-limiting process whereby only a certain number 
of total thoughts can be generated in a reasonable time period, so that participants in the both 
condition generate fewer thoughts of each type. However, inspection of the thought listings in the 
both condition revealed that participants tended to list supporting or consistent evidence before 
listing contradictory or inconsistent evidence. It is well known that in the process of making 
judgments or answering questions, people naturally tend to recruit information consistent with 
their tentatively preferred decision or answer (e.g., Dellarosa & Bourne, 1984; Koriat et al., 1980). 
This leads to a positive test strategy and confirmatory bias. What is less well known is 
that evidence generation is subject to interference effects (e.g., Hoch, 1984). In research on 
memory, it has been found that the very act of recall produces interference and forgetting 
(Roediger, 1978). For example, Rundus (1973) found that previously recalled list items interfered 
with the recall of new, unrecalled list items. According to Rundus, output interference is due in 
part to the strengthening of associations between the retrieval cues and the recalled items 
produced by the act of recall. This strengthening of associations increases the likelihood of 
retrieving the previously recalled items but at the expense of the new unrecalled items. By analogy 
with these memory findings, Hoch (1984) argued that generating a given reason for a decision or 
judgment will reduce the availability of other reasons through output interference. In particular, 
generating a supporting reason should interfere with the ability to generate a contradictory 
reason, and vice versa. In three experiments on predictive judgment, Hoch provided 
confirmation of output interference by manipulating the order in which supporting (pro) and 
contradictory (con) reasons were generated. He found that pro–con generation produced not only 
more pro than con reasons but also higher likelihood judgments than con–pro generation. 
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Experiment 3: Order of Generating Confirmatory 
and Disconfirmatory Cognitions in Evaluating Personality 
Descriptions 
 
In the evaluation of self-relevant information, people may be subject to similar interference 
effects: The generation of supporting evidence inhibits the generation of contradictory evidence 
and vice versa. This may be why, in Experiments 1 and 2, participants generated more supporting 
cognitions in the confirmatory-only condition and more contradictory cognitions in the 
disconfirmatory-only condition than those in the both condition did. In Experiment 3, I tested 
this output interference explanation by having some participants first generate a set of thoughts 
consistent with a personality description and then a set of thoughts inconsistent with the 
description (pro–con order) while other participants generated thoughts in the reverse order 
(con–pro). I expected that more thoughts would be generated for the first set than for the second 
set and that this order of generation effect would be associated with higher acceptance of the 
personality descriptions in the pro–con order than in the con–pro order. In comparison 
conditions, participants either generated thoughts in any order or generated no thoughts. 
Method 
 
Participants. Ninety-one college students (26 men and 65 women) were recruited for the study as 
participants in a project on “understanding personality processes.” The mean age of the sample 
was 21.1 years (SD = 3.1; ages ranged from 18 to 31). 
 
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing instructions and the 13 generalized 
personality descriptions corresponding to the original Barnum statements used by Forer (1949). 
The statements were described as having been devised for a new personality questionnaire, 
which the experimenter was interested in testing on college students. The order of presentation of 
the statements was randomized across participants. The thought-listing and accuracy rating tasks 
were the same as those used in Experiment 1. Participants in the pro–con order condition (n = 
22) were asked first to list thoughts that were consistent with the personality statements and then 
thoughts that were inconsistent with the personality statements. Participants in the con–pro 
order condition (n = 21) were asked first to list thoughts that were inconsistent with the 
personality statements and then thoughts that were consistent with the personality 
statements. Participants in the any-order condition (n = 24) were asked to list thoughts that were 
consistent and inconsistent with the personality statements. Participants in the no-thought-listing 
condition (n = 24) were not asked to list their thoughts. After the thought-listing task, 
participants then judged how accurately each statement described them on a scale that 
ranged from 1 (not at all accurate) to 10 (extremely accurate). Finally, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed about the study. 
Results 
 
The mean accuracy ratings are shown in Table 3. There was a significant main effect of thought-
listing condition, F(3, 87) = 4.91, p < .005. Planned comparisons showed that accuracy ratings 
were not significantly higher in the pro–con order condition (M = 7.29) than in the no-thought 
condition (M = 7.10; t < 1), but were significantly lower in the con–pro order condition (M = 6.19) 
than in the no-thought condition, t(87) = –2.85, p < .005, with no difference between the any-
order condition (M = 7.21) and the no-thought condition (t < 1). Further planned comparisons 
showed that accuracy ratings were not significantly higher in the pro–con order condition than in 
the any-order condition (t = 1), but were significantly lower in the con–pro order condition than 
in the any-order condition, t(87) = –3.18, p < .005. The numbers of consistent and inconsistent 
thoughts generated in the different thought-listing conditions are also shown in Table 3. 
Significantly more consistent thoughts (M = 2.63) than inconsistent thoughts (M = 2.13) were 
generated, F(1, 64) = 9.28, p < .005. However, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction 
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with thought-listing condition, F(1, 64) = 29.30, p < .001. As can be seen, significantly fewer 
consistent thoughts were generated in the con–pro order than in the pro–con or any-
order conditions, t(64) = 4.65, p < .001, whereas there was no difference between the pro–con 
and any-order condition, t(64) = 1.39, ns. Significantly more inconsistent thoughts were 
generated in the con–pro order than in the pro–con or any-order conditions, t(64) = 5.53, p < 
.001, whereas there was no difference between the pro–con and any-order condition (t < 1). 
 
There was a significant positive correlation between accuracy ratings and numbers of consistent 
thoughts (r = .44, p < .001) and a significant negative correlation between accuracy ratings 
and numbers of inconsistent thoughts (r = –.54, p < .001). To investigate the mediating role of 
thought generation, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was carried out. Such an analysis 
can provide evidence for the causal role of thought generation in judgments (e.g., Hoch, 1984). 
Using consistent and inconsistent thoughts as covariates in an ANCOVA of the accuracy ratings, 
it was found that the thought covariates were highly significant, F(2, 62) = 11.12, p < .001. 
Consequently, the significant effect of thought-listing condition on accuracy ratings obtained in 
the equivalent analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(2, 64) = 7.10, p < .01, was reduced to 
nonsignificance (F < 1) by the presence of the covariates. 
Discussion 
 
The present findings demonstrated output interference effects in the generation of thoughts and 
in rating the accuracy of the personality descriptions. In the pro–con order condition, 
significantly more consistent and fewer inconsistent thoughts were generated and accuracy 
ratings were significantly higher than in the con–pro order condition. However, the pro–con 
order condition did not differ significantly from the any-order condition or the no-thoughts 
condition. This confirms the impression from the previous experiments that, when generating 
both consistent and inconsistent thoughts, participants tended to produce supporting cognitions 
before contradictory cognitions. Formal analyses of the order of thoughts generated in the 
both/any-order conditions of the three studies showed that the first thoughts generated were 
significantly more likely to be consistent than inconsistent. The percentage of first thoughts that 
were consistent were as follows: Experiment 1 = 64% (Binomial test p = .007), Experiment 2 = 
65% (Binomial test p = .003), and Experiment 3 = 74% (Binomial test p < .001). 
 
These results also mean that, when spontaneously generating thoughts, there is an automatic 
output interference effect leading to more consistent than inconsistent thoughts and higher 
accuracy ratings for personality descriptions. Not only does the use of a positive test strategy lead 
to participants seeking out confirmatory evidence, but this in turn inhibits the retrieval of 
disconfirmatory evidence. By contrast, when participants are required to generate contradictory 
cognitions first, there is a dramatic effect on the generation of consistent and inconsistent 
thoughts and on ratings of accuracy. 
 
There is however an alternative explanation for the findings of Experiment 3. Rather than 
showing an output interference effect, the findings may reflect some sort of fatigue effect. That is, 
after generating the first type of thoughts, participants get tired and generate fewer of the second 
type of thoughts. Hoch (1984) considered the possibility that the output interference he had 
observed in the generation of reasons was due to fatigue or boredom. He argued that this rival 
explanation should lead to a decreasing trend in the number of reasons generated for each 
successive generation task. However, he found no evidence for such a decreasing trend across 
trials. I too carried out similar analyses on the number of consistent and inconsistent thoughts 
generated across trials (the 13 statements) and found no evidence for significant trends 
contrary to a fatigue explanation. 
 
However, even though no decreasing trend in number of thoughts generated was found across 
trials, it could still be that within each trial (i.e., for each statement) participants lose 
motivation or ability to generate more and more thoughts (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 
1999; Schwarz et al., 1991). To test this possibility, in Experiment 4, I used an experimenter 
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paced procedure for thought listing so that the generation of the first type of thoughts and the 
second type of thoughts occurred in separate time periods unlike in the previous studies. 
Experiment 4: Output Interference Effects and 
Personality Questionnaire Responding 
 
In this experiment, I sought to rule out a motivation/ability decrement explanation for the output 
interference effects observed in Experiment 3 by having the first and second types of 
thought generated in separate time periods. I also sought to extend the findings further to the 
prototypical paradigm of personality questionnaire responding (in this particular case, filling in 
the Neuroticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire [EPQ]). I expected more 
consistent than inconsistent thoughts to be generated in the pro–con order of generation than in 
the con–pro order and that Neuroticism scores would consequently be higher in the pro–con than 
in the con–pro order. 
Method 
 
Participants. Eighty-eight college students (24 men and 64 women) were recruited for the study 
as participants in a project on “understanding personality processes.” The mean age of the sample 
was 21.3 years (SD = 3.3; ages ranged from 18 to 37). 
 
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing instructions and the 12 questions of the 
Neuroticism scale of the short form Eysenck Personality Questionnaire–Revised (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975). The questions were described as having been devised for a new personality 
questionnaire, which the experimenter was interested in testing on college students. The order of 
presentation of the questions was randomized across participants. Participants in the pro–con 
order condition (n = 30) were asked first to list thoughts that were consistent with a “yes” answer 
to the questions and then thoughts that were consistent with a “no” answer to the questions. 
Participants in the con–pro order condition (n = 29) were asked first to list thoughts that were 
consistent with a “no” answer to the questions and then thoughts that were consistent with a “yes” 
answer to the questions. Participants were told that the study was experimenter paced and that 
they should turn to the next page only when instructed. They had 90 s to write down their first set 
of thoughts and then 90 s to write down their second set of thoughts. Participants in the no-
thought-listing condition (n = 29) were not asked to list their thoughts. After the thought-listing 
tasks, participants then gave their judgments as to whether each question described them or not 
(yes/no). All the items of the EPQ Neuroticism scale are phrased in a positive direction (yes = 1, 
no = 0) so that higher scores represent higher neuroticism. Finally, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed about the study. 
Results and Discussion 
 
The mean Neuroticism scores are shown in Table 4. There was a significant main effect of 
thought-listing condition, F(2, 85) = 4.39, p < .02. Planned comparisons showed that 
Neuroticism scores were not significantly higher in the pro–con order condition (M = 6.33) than 
in the no-thought condition (M = 5.97; t < 1), but were significantly lower in the con–pro order 
condition (M = 4.69) than in the no-thought condition, t(85) = –2.18, p < .05. 
 
The numbers of “yes” consistent and “no” consistent thoughts generated in the different thought-
listing conditions are also shown in Table 4. Overall, significantly more “yes” consistent 
thoughts (M = 2.65) than “no” consistent thoughts (M = 2.21) were generated, F(1, 57) = 4.51, p < 
.05. However, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction with thought-listing 
condition, F(1, 57) = 19.36, p < .001. As can be seen, significantly more “yes” consistent thoughts 
were generated in the pro–con order condition (M = 3.19) than in the con–pro order condition (M 
= 2.10), simple effect F(1, 57) = 20.81, p < .001, whereas significantly more “no” consistent 
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thoughts were generated in the con–pro order condition (M = 2.56) than in the pro–con 
order condition (M = 1.87), simple effect F(1, 57) = 5.75, p < .02. 
 
There was a significant positive correlation between Neuroticism scores and numbers of “yes” 
consistent thoughts (r = .46, p < .001) and a significant negative correlation between 
Neuroticism scores and numbers of “no” consistent thoughts (r = –.51, p < .001). Using “yes” and 
“no” consistent thoughts as covariates in an ANCOVA of the Neuroticism scores, it was found that 
the thought covariates were highly significant, F(2, 55) = 10.78, p < .001. Consequently, the 
significant effect of thought-listing condition on Neuroticism scores obtained in the equivalent 
ANOVA, F(1, 57) = 7.97, p < .01, was reduced to nonsignificance (F < 1) by the presence of the 
covariates. These results therefore confirm the findings of Experiment 3 and support the existence 
of an output interference effect when people respond to personality questionnaire items. 
General Discussion 
 
Confirmatory bias is the tendency to seek out information that is consistent with a belief or 
hypothesis and to ignore or overlook information that is inconsistent. A key element in 
confirmatory bias is the use of a positive test strategy. Such a strategy involves testing a 
hypothesis by looking for examples where the hypothesized property is expected to be present 
rather than absent. This positive test strategy is likely to lead to hypothesis confirmation 
if evidence consistent with the hypothesis is obtained. For example, Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, and 
Reber (1993) found that when asked directional questions such as “Are you happy with your 
social life?” or “Are you extraverted?” respondents tended to think of examples confirming rather 
than contradicting the hypothesized characteristic and they concluded that they were more likely 
to possess the attribute than those respondents asked the opposite question. 
 
Davies (1997) found that people use a positive test strategy when evaluating the accuracy of 
personality feedback. They generated more confirmatory than disconfirmatory cognitions in 
response to the feedback and their accuracy ratings reflected this relative availability of 
confirming versus disconfirming evidence. However, this research and the research by Kunda et 
al. (1993) provided only inferential evidence for the role of positive test strategies because 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory processing were not experimentally manipulated. 
 
In the present series of experiments, more direct evidence for the role of positive test strategies 
was obtained by experimentally manipulating confirmatory and disconfirmatory processing. 
Inducing respondents to generate only thoughts consistent with personality descriptions resulted 
in more confirmatory cognitions and higher accuracy ratings for the descriptions, whereas 
inducing respondents to generate only thoughts inconsistent with the personality descriptions 
resulted in more disconfirmatory cognitions and lower accuracy ratings for the descriptions. Of 
importance, these findings were obtained outside of the personality feedback paradigm. In the 
present studies, participants evaluated the extent to which self-relevant statements described 
them without any suggestion that the statements represented personality feedback. Indeed, in 
Experiment 4, the participants were responding to genuine personality questionnaire items. 
 
The novel finding arising from Experiments 3 and 4 is the operation of an output interference 
effect in the evaluation of self-relevant information. Use of a positive test strategy leads people to 
seek out evidence that is consistent with a hypothesized property. On top of this, however, output 
interference means that this retrieval of confirming evidence actively inhibits the retrieval of 
disconfirming evidence further magnifying any confirmatory bias. Thus, when evaluating a self-
relevant characteristic, people spontaneously retrieve examples confirming the presence of 
the hypothesized property (positive test strategy), which in turn makes it more difficult for them 
to recruit contradictory examples (output interference). 
 
There are a number of significant implications of these findings. The first is the issue of the 
stability versus malleability of the self concept. At any given time, the “working self concept” 
(Markus & Kunda, 1986) consists of only a subset of the total store of knowledge about the self. 
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Any factors or situations that affect the accessibility of confirming or disconfirming information 
about the self may at least temporarily influence one’s view of the self by altering the contents of 
the working self concept (e.g., Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Kunda et al., 1993; Rhodewalt 
& Agustsdottir, 1986). For example, a person applying for a job as a firefighter would be advised 
to present themselves as fit, resourceful, brave, yet careful. In communicating this impression to 
the job interviewer, this person’s working self concept would contain many examples that confirm 
and few that disconfirm these attributes and their postinterview self concept might well differ 
from their preinterview self concept. 
 
The second implication of the findings is the issue of question phrasing in questionnaires (e.g., 
Schwarz & Sudman, 1992). If people tend to retrieve confirming evidence for a statement 
or question, then questionnaires need to be “balanced,” such that half the items are phrased in 
one direction and the other half are phrased in the reverse direction so that simply agreeing with 
the statements does not automatically lead to a high score on the measure of interest. This is the 
old issue of acquiescence that is well known but not that well understood (e.g., Paulhus, 
1991). However, the present findings go beyond a simple acquiescent response set. They suggest 
that participants who are motivated to confirm a particular characteristic in the self concept are 
likely to do so regardless of whether the items are phrased in one direction or the other. What 
personality or situational factors influence the tendency to confirm or deny a particular trait in 
the self is an interesting question that deserves further research. 
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